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When the master of The Reynolds, in an attempt to save the vessel, deliberately
damaged Vincent's dock by keeping the ship moored to it during a raging storm, he
knew that the law protected him against any interference. But he may not have
foreseen that the Minnesota court would hold the shipowner responsible in damages
for "having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock."' We would perhaps
be reluctant to apply the same rule against a drowning beggar who saved his life
by using and damaging a rich man's yacht. Should we argue, then, with the dissenting judge in the Vincent case that such emergencies, constituting inevitable accidents, exclude all liability for fault? The laws of most civil law countries have preferred this solution.2 But, again, we would probably be reluctant to apply this rule
in favor of a drowning millionaire who saves his life by using and damaging the
boat of a poor fisherman.
To avoid the choice between general liability and general immunity of tortfeasors
acting in necessity, the laws of many countries will, in such cases, take into account
the parties' comparative insulation against loss and, partially at least, base liability
on their respective wealths. While this answer is repulsive to Anglo-American tradition, its rationale could perhaps be adopted in a different manner. Since the spread
of liability insurance, wealth has no longer been the only, or even the most effective,
insulation against loss. Could we not make The Reynolds' liability contingent on
her owner's protection by liability insurance? At first glance we are inclined to say
that insurance can only protect against liability, but not create it. To show that a
new rule to the contrary may be in the making, to trace this development and to
analyze its broader significance, is the purpose of this paper. This discussion should
be preceded by a brief presentation of the economic background of our problem.
In the absence of facts supporting liability either under the general fault dogma or
a specific rule, the doctrine of laissez faire is satisfied with letting "the loss rest
where it falls." In such cases, it is claimed, any interference by the law would merely
effect an unjustifiable shift of loss between innocent parties.
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This reasoning is correct from the standpoint of the national economy, within
which any physical loss results in a reduction of existing values. Within individual
economies, however, interference by the law can do a great deal more. If individual
loss is measured by the quantity and quality of the satisfaction impaired or by the
"marginal utility" of the assets affected, the law can magnify or minimize the total
of individual losses by allocating them to persons more or less readily capable of
bearing them.
Richesse Obligi

Almost a half century ago, Josef Unger, following this thought, urged that liability
without fault should take into account the relative financial capacities of the parties."
"Richesse Oblige," he felt, should become a basic principle of the law of torts.
While the economic justification of this postulate seems clear, its legal application
requires decisive modification.
Neither Josef Unger nor anybody after him has ever suggested that the wealthy
should bear all accidental losses of the poor. What has been called the "principle of
the smallest harm"4 has never been carried that far. Nor do we, in the absence of
"fault," wish to make a rich man, merely because of his wealth, pay for a poor man's
loss even if he has caused that loss. Any such liability for mere causation could,
within our present system of tort liability, be based only on the paradoxical assumption that a person innocently causing injury is "less innocent" than the injured.'
There is one kind of causation without fault, however, to which the principle
of the smallest harm is applied to an ever increasing extent. Beyond rudimentary
strict liabilities of incompetent persons and for misdeeds of animals and other
dangerous things, the "negligence" liabilities of both civil law and common law
countries have come to aim primarily at an equitable distribution of risk rather than
at censuring a wrongdoer or deterring the public. The French the'orie de risque
is perhaps the most significant expression of this shift of emphasis.' In other countries, too, presumptions or evidentiary rules, such as those in some places supporting
the employer's liability for his employees,' have enabled judges and juries to apply
rules of fault liability to the unavoidable causation of harm by hazardous enterprise.
Further developing this thought, the American Law Institute would impose liability
for the inevitable miscarriage of lawful ultra-hazardous activities 8 An even more
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general liability for "instruments and substances dangerous per se" has been the law
of Mexico since I932.' I have elsewhere attempted to segregate and analyze those
and similar liabilities as based on what can perhaps be called "negligence without
fault."10
If we assume in all these cases that the actor has engaged in a dangerous activity
for the sake of material or ideal profit, we may conclude that within the actor's
economy any loss resulting from his liability is reduced by that profit, and is smaller,
to that extent at least, than the loss his victim would have to bear if the loss were
left to rest where it fell. Any liability imposed on the hctor can thus be rationalized
under the principle of the smallest harm.
Only in a few instances have legal rules ever openly stated this rationale. It is
at this point that the history of the civil law can perhaps show the way to conscious
progress. More than 150 years ago, the Prussian Code, presumably following natural
law doctrine,"' adopted a rule which has gained or should gain a theoretical significance by far exceeding its practical importance. An incompetent person or an infant,
though generally permitted to carry on his hazardous activities at public expense, may
be held liable for harm caused by him under the principle of the smallest harm
according to the respective'wealth of the parties. The Austrian Code of 1813 added
a similar rule regarding persons inflicting injury in emergency1
In conformity with suggestions made by Otto Gierke,' Section 752(I) of the
Second Draft for a German Civil Code contained a rule generalizing these provisions
to include other cases of causation without fault. The reasons for the rejection: of
this far-reaching proposal are well known. The "Romanistic" influence prevailed,'"
and all that was saved was Section 829 of the Code which in substance repeats the
Austrian provision. Similar rules have been enacted in Belgium, China, Denmark,
Greece, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, and
Turkey.'" By an ironic turn of legal history it was the Soviet Code which, in cono Federal Civil Code of Mexico, Sec. 191 3 .
0 An extensive study under this heading will be published shortly.
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scious reliance on its model, adopted the principle originally proposed for the
German law 1 This background of the Soviet provision should make us remember that a tort liability partially determined by wealth would not be a revolutionary
product of a communist economy but a consistent extension of a thought rooted
in the natural law of the eighteenth century, recognized in "capitalistic" laws for
7
200 years, and persistently advocated by Continental writers.
One may concede that the pioneer tradition of our Western world would resist
a general liability of this type as hampering private initiative, though a similar
resistance has been easily overcome in the law and practice of progressive taxation.
Somehow it seems less objectionable to have the community of wealth pay for social
services than to have a wealthy individual pay for loss innocently caused by him to
a less pecunious compatriot. Arguments of this kind have failed, however, to prevent legislatures, juries, and judges anywhere from favoring tort claims against those
innocent tortfeasors who, as entrepreneurs, are able to shift their losses to the public

by increasing the price for their services or merchandise. True, this tendency must
meet resistance as long as actual loss distribution may be precluded by competitive
conditions or otherwise. But this resistance, it may be claimed, has lost much of its
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justification since the spread of liability insurance which enables the entrepreneur
tortfeasor to distribute his loss, beyond his own economic sphere, within a larger
community of risk. Does then the principle of the smallest harm, while not supporting a liability measured by wealth, require us to impose a liability based on insurance? Is it true then that not only "richesse oblige," as Unger has said, but
that insurance obligates as well?

Assurance Oblige
At first glance, this suggestion seems paradoxical. Liability insurance, it will
be said, is insurance against liability, and where there is no liability there can be no
insurance against it. Obvious as it seems, this argument does not defeat the idea
but merely invites further refinement-once it is recognized that liability insurance
has long transcended its original meaning and mission.
The fundamental problem of the nature of liability insurance arose first when this
insurance was permitted to protect a guilty injurer against the very liability purportedly designed to deter him and others from similar "wrongdoings." Timid attempts at prohibiting this liability insurance on that ground as illegal failed at their

inception.' And rightly so, for the liability insured against was in most cases a
fault liability only in name, and the defendant's protection by liability insurance did
in no way impair its primary rationale, namely, the equitable distribution of losses.
On the contrary, that rationale was more effectively secured by that insurance which,
consequently, has not only everywhere been recognized as lawful but has even been
made compulsory in many countries.'9 But the resulting inconsistency between the
two functions of liability insurance as a protection against existing liabilities and as a
device for shifting enterprise risks has appeared in many ways. The most significant
product of this inconsistency is perhaps the rule, now widely adopted, that the
injured himself may claim indemnification from the insurer, sometimes in disregard
of the fact that the insured has forfeited his protection 2
That the significance of liability insurance now reaches far beyond the parties

to the contract appears similarly in the converse situation in which the injured is fully
or partially indemnified under either a private insurance contract, or a scheme of
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social insurance such as workmen's compensation, or a general health insurance of
the kind now in force in Great Britain. Can such a person recover twice even if
his injury was caused by an accident of a type inevitable in the operation of modern
mechanical enterprises? Here, too, the rationale of both enterprise liability and
enterprise liability insurance is in issue. True, where tort liability is essentially
liability for a "wrong," denial of double recovery would result in an unjustifiable
windfall to the injurer. But where, as in -cases of an entrepreneur's liability for
"negligence without fault,"21 risk distribution is the primary rationale, the answer is
less obvious 2 Once a loss is distributed through "first party" (life, health, or
accident) insurance among persons sharing similar risks of injury, much could
be said against shifting the loss, either by a second recovery of the insured or by
subrogation of the insurer, to other persons sharing similar risks of liability. It may
have been for that reason that the Supreme Court of the United States has denied
the Government recovery from an entrepreneur "wrongdoer'; for compensation paid
to an injured soldier 3 The same reason, it may be assumed, underlies recent
British legislation under which in any action for a personal injury there must be
taken into account one half of the social insurance benefits accrued or likely to
accrue from such injury 4 In this country, too, judges and juries even without
legislative interference will probably be less likely to favor the plaintiff, if and where
his protection by private or social insurance will have become a matter of course.
Contrary to the principles underlying most American compensation statutes, this
"mitigating effect on damages"25 should ultimately prevail where the plaintiff relies
on a tort liability primarily based on risk distribution rather than fault.
The impact on the law of torts of both "first party" and liability insurance should
make us more inclined to let insurance, like wealth, affect liability under the principle of the smallest harm. Yet we will hardly be inclined to predicate liability on
the sole fact that an insurer has agreed to assume it. Not because such a rule would
be "illogical" but because it would be undesirable as discriminating between plaintiffs injured by insured persons and others. We feel that he who injures the plaintiff innocently, e.g., in self-defense, should not be held liable merely because he carries
insurance against all liabilities. Recovery in such a case would constitute an unjustifiable windfall for the plaintiff who could not reasonably expect the existence of such
insurance. On the other hand, there should be liability for a hazardous activity
against liability from which the actor could be expected to insure himself, whether
or not he actually carried such insurance. Thus, not the actual existence of liability
"See

note io supra.
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insurance should be the test for applying the principle of the smallest harm, but
the fact that the defendant could reasonably be expected to carry such insurance.
Not insurance itself obligates, but "Assurabilit6 Oblige."
Assurabilit Oblige
This last formulation invites another possible objection to the theory here proposed. Why should the airplane passenger be able to recover from the operator of
his plane because the latter should have taken out (liability) insurance, although
the plaintiff himself, before boarding the plane, could very well have been expected
to protect himself by (life and accident) insurance? Indeed, a future system of
liability for modern enterprise will have to decide on the preferability of either
"first party" (life, accident, fire) or "third party" (liability) insurance for each of
the more important typical hazards. Whether the passenger or the operator of
the airplane should "bear the loss," i., whether or not the latter should be held
liable in tort, will in this sense depend on whether there should be a community
of risk between all passengers or all operators, or, in other words, who should in
fairness pay the premium'
Ultimately, failure to insure in such cases may become
the basis of a new type of liability for fault.
The present need for such an analysis appears in those isolated but significant
cases in which the availability of first party insurance has affected the law of tort
liability. Thus, in the largely metropolitan jurisdiction of New York the availability
to house owners of fire insurance was given as a reason for the limitation of the
liability for negligent fires.27 Similar thoughts have found expression in international
law which, being free of hampering traditions, frequently anticipates desirable national developments. A British Royal Commission on Compensation for Suffering and
Damage by Enemy Action, stated the general principle "that in the case of persons
whose position justified the expectation that, in the ordinary course of things, they
would appreciate and resort to insurance, it would be inequitable to allow them t6
rank, when insurance was available for their protection against the losses actually
incurred."'2S
Only this approach, which would consciously choose the most desirable medium
for the distribution of risks, will ultimately solve the present wasteful practice of
mutual recoveries between insurance companies and other distributors of risks. The
Supreme Court of the United States recently permitted accident insurers to recover
as subrogees from the Federal Government under a federal statute which in terms
protects only the injured himself.2" It is regrettable that the Court in so holding
" See HARRY SHULMAN AND FLEMING JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS I25 (1942), discussing
Regan v. New York & New England R. R., 6o Conn. 124, 22 Atl. 503 (1891).
" Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N. Y. 25o, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866) (liability for damage
to adjoining house but not to second or more remote house).
22 MARJORIE M. WHITEMtAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1315 (937),
with additional references.
" United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366 (1949). Cf. Note, 58 YALE L. J.
1395 (1949); James, Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. Rav.
1156 (1941).
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failed to consider the underlying economic issue whether risk distribution through
taxation, necessitated by admitting subrogation, is preferable to risk distribution
through the increase of first party insurance premiums caused by the denial of
subrogation.
It is true that a liability test based on the availability of liability insurance would,
for some time to come, frequently imply injustice with regard to those particular
defendants or activities which, reasonably or arbitrarily, would be rejected by insurers. But a beginning must be made to replace our obsolete pseudo-fault formulas
of civil liability by new tests taking account of modern developments. Once this
beginning has been made in the law, business will follow suit. And business will
do more. It will continue to blast new ways even where the law stays behind, as it
has done in the so-called "medical first payment revolution" which has secured to
bystanders of automobile accidents the benefit of "liability insurance" without regard
to liability.30
While a consistent formulation of new principles will have to await the development of consistent standards of insurability, it should be of interest that several
imaginative American courts have courageously anticipated that development in a
few typical situations.
Under the age-old principle, "The King can do no wrong," governmental agencies
in the United States cannot be held for torts committed by their officials. The fact,
however, that such agencies have to an increasing extent engaged in private enterprise has, in many cases, conferred on them a competitive advantage and exposed
the public to unjustifiable risks and losses. Several American courts have therefore
abandoned this anachronism and held municipalities and other governmental agencies
liable where, in view of the existence of liability insurance, they can do so without
burdening the taxpayer 3 Similar holdings have established the liability of charitable
institutions and trust estates,32" which otherwise are held immune to safeguard their
funds for the purposes of their creation. And finally, lawsuits between spouses and
other members of one family, otherwise prohibited to preserve domestic peace, have
occasionally been permitted where it is the liability insurer who ultimately bears the
loss.
That these decisions may foreshadow even more significant developments is
" See Yore, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage Points a New Way, The Spectator (Property
edition), Feb. 22, 1940. This type of insurance seems to be spreading both to new types of insurance
and new groups of persons. See James, supra note 2o, at 565; and in general 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCEI
LAW AND PRACTICE §§4895, 4896 (1942, Supp. 1949).
"Rogers v. Butler, 17o Tenn. 125, 92 S. W. 2d 414 (1936)

(based on the assumption of a "waiver of

immunity").
Contra, e.g., Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N. W. 2d 736 (1947).
1
2See, e.g., Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 II1. App. 6x8, 76 N. E. 2d 342 (1947); O'Connor v.
Boulder, Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 1o5 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939); Vanderbilt University v.
Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W. 2d 284 (1938); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont,
76 A. 2d 230 (1950). See also Justice Rutledge's searching opinion in President and Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F. 2d 81o, 823, 824 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
33See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 15o Ad. 905 (930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166
S. E. 538 (1932); Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, x6 So. x9 (1935); James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549, 565 (1948).
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indicated by such statements as that of an eminent American judge who based a
manufacturer's liability inter alia on the consideration that "the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business."34 A spreading understanding of this truth will inevitably lead to the
ultimate abolition of that often criticized game of "hide and seek" which now prohibits American plaintiffs from alleging and proving the existence of the defendant's
liability insurance. 35
I have not been able to find traces of this approach in Continental decisions or
writings. But Continental legislators and scholars, who have openly introduced the
principle of the smallest harm, should now be ready to consider the question whether
insurance or insurability as bases of liability are not equivalent or even superior to

comparative wealth. An indigent incompetent person has a thoughtful guardian
who, anxious to protect both his ward and the public, has insured his ward against
whatever liability he may incur because of his illness. Section I31O of the Austrian
Code, Section 829 of the German Code, or Article 58 of the Swiss Code could well
be applied if the insured injures another impecunious person. The poor fisherman
of our example could be similarly protected by the sportsman's insurer. Modifications or interpretations of existing statutes to this effect, insignificant as they may
seem, would prepare the ground for the important developments foreshadowed in
the American decisions just discussed.
The suggested extension of liability will perhaps be more easily acceptable once
legislators, courts, and scholars will have recognized the need for a corresponding
limitation of tort liability in view of the progress of social insurance. The employee,
the pedestrian, or the consumer who was injured by an accident inevitable in modern
mass enterprise and indemnified for his loss under some scheme of social compensation created for his protection against these very accidents, should not be permitted
to avail himself against the entrepreneur of the ancient rule of liability for negligence
which, though directed against a wrongdoer, was put at his disposal as a liability
for "negligence without fault" at a time when, and it is believed only as long as,
no other remedy was available.
As I have said before, I am fully aware of the strangeness of my proposition to
the ears of both civil law and common law lawyers. How could it be that tort
liability should be contingent on the very insurance designed to protect against such
liability? I have tried to show not only that this proposition can be justified on economic grounds, but that it loses some of its strangeness and reveals more of its rationale if modified so as to relate to the reasonable expectability and availability of liability
insurance. In that sense, what first appears as an extreme and somewhat absurd prin"' Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P. 2d 436,
441 (1944).
" A number of courts here, too, have decided to put reality above obsolete concepts. See, e.g., Jessup
v. Davis, x5 Neb. i, 2i N. W. 19o (1926). This trend is approved in 2 JoHn H. WIGMORE, EvIoEcE
X46 ( 3 d ed. 1940).
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ciple of strict liability may become more readily acceptable as a new type of liability
for fault.
The law will grow. True, to write a law defining the scope of the new liability
will not be easy with a business practice unsettled and not yet conscious of its
mission. But the Great Codes of the civil law have shown the way, and where
legislation must lag behind, we should look to the common law, that marvel of
unending growth which, slow, groping, and often disturbing in its apparent lack of
logic, is so miraculously self-confident and wise.

